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Andrew Flavelle Martin* The Attorney General as Lawyer (?):
Confidentiality Upon Resignation from
Cabinet
The unique role of the attorney general raises several special issues of legal ethics.
This paper addresses one previously unaddressed: whether it is appropriate for
the attorney general to publicly announce his or her reasons for resighing from
Cabinet. Unlike other ministers, the attorney general is almost always a practicing
lawyer and thus bound not only by Cabinet solidarity and Cabinet confidentiality,
but also by the lawyer's professional duty of confidentiality and by solicitor-client
privilege. The paper begins by canvassing a hierarchy of reasons for a principled
resignation and the rare historical examples where these have occurred. It
then turns to the roles of the attorney general, analyzing how the legal ethics
implications of the primary role-legal advisor to Cabinet-may be affected by
two more amorphous roles: legal advisor to the legislature and guardian of the
public interest. Finally, it considers the special case of the non-lawyer attorney
general and how these issues would apply, as well as the more common situation
of lawyers with other portfolios.
Le role unique du procureur general soul~ve de nombreuses questions
particulieres au chapitre de I'ethique juridique. L'auteur examine une question
jusqu'ici pass6e sous silence: est-il appropri6 que le procureur g~neral annonce
publiquement les motifs de sa demission du Cabinet. Au contraire des autres
ministres, le procureur general est presque toujours un avocat en pratique. II est
par consequent 10 non seulement par la solidaritd envers le cabinet et ses regles
de confidentialit6, mais egalement par le devoir de confidentialite et par le secret
professionnel de Iavocat. Lauteur examine d'abord divers motifs d'une demission
pour des raisons de principe et les rares exemples oCi cela s'est produit. II se
tourne ensuite vers les r6les du procureur general et analyse la fagon dont les
implications 6thiques et juridiques de son role principal-conseiller juridique du
cabinet-peuvent Otre touchees par deux rOles plus en retrait: conseillerjuridique
du I6gislateur et gardien de linterOt public. Enfin, il examine le cas particulier
du procureur general qui n'est pas un avocat et la fagon dont ces questions
se poseraient, ainsi que la situations plus frequente d'avocats qui ont d'autres
portefeuilles.
* Of the Ontario Bar; SJD Candidate, University of Toronto. Thanks to Adam Dodek, John
Papadopoulos, Helena Likwomik, Graham Boswell, and Candice Telfer for their comments on a
draft. Thanks also to Jeanette Bosschart of the Law Society of Upper Canada's Great Library for her
assistance. Changes proposed in this article are advocated in the public interest.
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Introduction
I. Resignations from Cabinet
II. The attorney general on resignation
1. As legal advisor to Cabinet
2. As legal advisor to both Cabinet and legislature
3. As both legal advisor to Cabinet and "guardian of the public
interest"
Il. The non-lawyer attorney general on resignation from Cabinet
IV. Lawyers with other portfolios on resignation from Cabinet
Conclusion
Introduction
The provincial or federal attorney general is, among other things, the
government's lawyer and a member of Cabinet. These multiple roles can
produce several dilemmas for the attorney general who seeks to honour his
or her ethical obligations as a lawyer. While recent Canadian legal ethics
literature has moved to focusing more on government lawyers than on the
attorney general herself,' there remain unresolved issues of the lawyer as
politician that uniquely affect that particular office. In this paper, I return
to the attorney general and the implications of the rules of legal ethics
upon a resignation from Cabinet-specifically, whether those rules allow
the attorney general to publicly disclose the reason why he or she resigned.
While it is generally accepted that one function of a minister's
resignation is to free him from Cabinet solidarity and Cabinet
confidentiality so as to allow him to publicly disagree with a decision he
did not support, there has been little examination of whether resignation
1. See, e.g., Adam M Dodek, "Lawyering at the Intersection of Public Law and Legal Ethics:
Government Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of Law" (2010) 33:1 Dal LJ 1 [Dodek, "Intersection"]
and the articles cited by Dodek at 5, n 9. More recently see Malliha Wilson, Taia Wong & Kevin Hille,
"Professionalism and the Public Interest" (2011) 38:1 Adv Q 1; Patrick J Monahan, "'In the Public
Interest': Understanding the Special Role of the Government Lawyer" (2013) 63 SCLR (2d) 43;
Michael H Morris & Sandra Nishikawa, "The Orphans of Legal Ethics: Why Government Lawyers
Are Different-and How We Protect and Promote that Difference in Service of the Rule of Law and
the Public Interest" (2013) 26 Can J Admin L & Prac 171.
2. See, e.g., Canada, Privy Council Office, Accountable Government: A Guide for Ministers and
Ministers of State (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2011) at para 1.2, online: Office of the Prime Minister
<www.pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/guidemin e.pdf>: "Ministers and Ministers of State cannot dissociate
themselves from or repudiate the decisions of Cabinet or their Ministry colleagues unless they resign
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is sufficient to allow the attorney general to do so. As a member of Cabinet
and a lawyer, the attorney general is bound not only by Cabinet solidarity
and Cabinet confidentiality, but also by solicitor-client privilege and the
lawyer's professional duty of confidentiality. The existing literature on
the modem role of the attorney general has two primary focuses. One
is her role in advising Cabinet and Parliament on the constitutionality
of government bills, and particularly the appropriate course of action if
Cabinet rejects her advice.' The other is her role in litigation, particularly
when, if ever, it is appropriate for her to make concessions and decline to
appeal adverse decisions,4 and to a lesser extent when it is appropriate for
from the Ministry." See also Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Lmv of Canada, 5th ed supp (Toronto:
Carswell, 2007) vol 1 (loose-leaf 2006, release 1), ch 9 at 14 [Hogg, Constitutional Lmv]:
All cabinet ministers collectively accept responsibility for cabinet decisions. This means
that a cabinet minister is obliged to give public support to any decision reached by the
cabinet, even if the minister personally opposed the decision within the cabinet and still
disagrees with it. If the minister does decide to express dissent in public, then the minister
should resign.
Hogg, ibid, further asserts that he resignation itself does not free the minister to announce why he
resigned: "Even after a minister resigns or is dismissed, the obligations of [cabinet] confidentiality and
unanimity continue, but the Prime Minister will normally give permission to the minister to publish his
or her reasons for resignation." However, this assertion-for which Hogg provides no authority-is
overly formalistic and appears to be contrary to actual practice.
3. Ian G Scott, "The Role of the Attorney General and the Charter of Rights" (1987) 29:2 Crim
LQ 187 at 192-196 [Scott, "The AG & the Charter"]; The Honourable Ian Scott, "Law, Policy, and
the Role of the Attorney General: Constancy and Change in the 1980s" (1989) 39:2 UTLJ 109 at 123-
126 [Scott, "Constancy & Change"]; Grant Huscroft, "The Attorney General and Charter Challenges
to Legislation: Advocate or Adjudicator?" (1995) 5 NJCL 125 at 135-141 [Huscroft, "Advocate or
Adjudicator"]; Kent Roach, "The Attorney General and the Charter Revisited" (2000) 50:1 UTLJ 1
at 34-38 [Roach, "Revisited"]; Debra M McAllister, "The Attorney General's Role as Guardian of
the Public Interest in Charter Litigation" (2002) 21 Windsor YB Access Just 47 at 57, 62-64; Kent
Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer: The Attorney General as Defender of the Rule of Law"
(2006) 31:2 Queen's LJ 598 at 620-626, 633-642 [Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer"];
Lori Sterling, "The Charter's Impact on the Legislative Process: Where the Real 'Dialogue' Takes
Place" (2007) 23 NJCL 139 at 145-147; Lori Sterling & Heather Mackay, "The Independence of the
Attorney General in the Civil Law Sphere" (2009) 34:2 Queen's LJ 891 at 894-902; Grant Huscroft,
"Reconciling Duty and Discretion: The Attorney General in the Charter Era" (2009) 34:2 Queen's
LJ 773 at 775-795 [Huscroft, "Duty & Discretion"]. On reporting under the Canadian Bill of Rights,
SC 1960, c 44, s 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix Ill [Bill of Rights], see Elmer A Driedger, "The
Meaning and Effect of the Canadian Bill of Rights: A Draftsman's Viewpoint" (1977) 9:2 Ottawa L Rev
303 at 306, 310-312. On reporting under the Department of Justice Act, RSC 1985, c J-2, s 4.1 [DOJA]
for non-compliance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter], see also Janet
L Hiebert, "Parliamentary Engagement with the Charter: Rethinking the Idea of Legislative Rights
Review" (2012) 58 SCLR (2d) 87 at 88-92 and Jennifer Bond, "Failure to Report: The Manifestly
Unconstitutional Nature of the Human Smugglers Act" (2014) 51:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 377. Note that
many of these sources (and those mentioned in the next two notes) are cited by Dodek, "Intersection,"
supra note 1 at 6, n 10.
4. See The Honourable Justice Ian Binnie, "Mr. Attorney Ian Scott and the Ghost of Sir Oliver
Mowat" (2004) 22:4 Advocates' Society J 4 at 10; Huscroft, "Duty & Discretion," supra note 3 at 795-
810; Huscroft, "Advocate or Adjudicator," supra note 3 at 141-161; McAllister, supra note 3 at 73-90;
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her to appear in court.5 Within this first focus, there is substantial attention
given to the circumstances under which the attorney general should resign
from Cabinet.6 However, rarely do these commentators address whether
the resigning attorney general can publicly announce her reasons for
resignation, as could the typical Cabinet member. There are indeed a few
exceptions. In discussing the career of former Ontario Attorney General
[an Scott, Justice Ian Binnie implicitly raised the possibility: "Much will
be said at today's symposium about the 'independence of the attorney
general.' Does he have the obligation to speak out publicly if his colleagues
fail to accept his advice? Should he resign?"' Similarly, Grant Huscroft
discusses a signalling function of resignation, but is unclear about whether
the attorney general publicly stating the reason for the resignation is part
of that signalling:
If the Attorney General considers that a bill is not even arguably
consistent with the Charter-if, in other words, the Attorney General
considers that the government is repudiating its Charter obligations-
the Attorney General should resign in order to signal that the
government is not committed to respecting the constitution .... Good faith
disagreement between the Attorney General and the government about
the interpretation and application of the Charter is possible, but even in
these circumstances it is not tenable for the Attorney General to continue
in office; there is no room for public disagreement between the Crown
and its Chief Law Officer about the requirements of the constitution.'
Presumably, without a public disclosure there could be little effective
signalling, and the prime minister or premier or other members of Cabinet
should not be expected to objectively characterize the reason for the
Roach, "Revisited," supra note 3 at 22-25; Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer," supra note 3
at 605-615; Scott, "The AG & the Charter," supra note 3 at 196-197; Sterling & Mackay, supra note
3 at 906-913; Graeme Mitchell, "The Role of the Attorney General in Litigation under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Reflections on Where We Are After Twenty Years and Where We
May Be Going" in 2002 Isaac Pitblado Lectures: The Charter: Twenty Years and Beyond (Winnipeg:
Law Society of Manitoba, 2002) VI-I at VI-9-VI- 19.
5. The Honourable Marc Rosenberg, "The Attorney General and the Administration of Criminal
Justice" (2009) 34:2 Queen's LJ 813 at 846-849, discussing in part the contrary view in The Honourable
Brian RD Smith, "The Role of the Attorney General-or Walking the Tightrope" (1988) 46 Advocate
255. See especially Rosenberg at 847: "Their intervention in important constitutional cases is proper
and welcomed. I would be concerned, however, if the Attorney General appeared in more mundane
cases, and especially in any criminal case."
6. As discussed further below (see infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text), there are at most
a few of these situations. Foremost is Cabinet's attempted interference with the attorney general's
carriage of criminal proceedings. Less unanimous is Cabinet's rejection of the attorney general's
advice that a proposed law or other action is unconstitutional.
7. Binnie, supra note 4 at 9.
8. Huscrofi, "Duty & Discretion," supra note 3 at 794-795. (Professor Huscroft is now Justice
Huscroft of the Ontario Court of Appeal.)
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resignation.9 Huscroft's last sentence in this passage can also can be read
as suggesting that resignation might allow public disagreement, i.e., that
there is room for public disagreement between the Crown and its former
chief law officer. Similarly, Kent Roach characterizes Peter Hogg's view
as that "the Attorney General is bound by the convention of 'collective
responsibility' of Cabinet and would have to resign the office if he or she
wished to continue to oppose the policy.""
Most explicit have been Justice Marc Rosenberg and John Edwards,
in the context of Cabinet interference with prosecutions. Rosenberg writes
that "[t]he resignation of the Attorney General would expose any attempted
interference by the premier or the cabinet both to the public and especially
to the press, and would further entrench the convention of institutional
independence."" Rosenberg also quotes Edwards to similar effect:
It must be emphasised that to recognise the inevitability of dismissal or
resignation in these circumstances in no sense represents a weakening
of the Attorney General's constitutional position. What it entails is
the removal of the issue from the confidential environment of Cabinet
deliberations and its exposure to the full glare ofpublic attention. 1
2
Both of these statements necessarily assume that solicitor-client privilege
and the lawyer's professional duty of confidentiality do not preclude such
publicity.
The primary purpose of this paper, then, is to explore the special
responsibilities of the attorney general as a member of Cabinet and as a
lawyer, specifically by addressing how the rules of legal ethics apply to the
attorney general announcing the reasons for his resignation from Cabinet.
To the extent that those rules appear to preclude such an announcement,
it will also examine whether there is a way to reconcile or otherwise
overcome this conflict where the announcement seems appropriate or
necessary. It will also address how the relevant issues apply to an attorney
9. In the rest of this paper, the prime minister (at the federal level) and the premier (at the provincial
level) are interchangeable. For clarity and brevity, I will use the phrase prime mitiister to mean the
prime minister or the premier.
10. Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer," supra note 3 at 606-607 [emphasis added], citing
Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed (Scarborough: Carswell, 1992) at 1265 and n 16.
The corresponding text in the current edition is Hogg, Constitutional La, supra note 2, vol 2 (loose-
leaf 2009, release 1), ch 36 at 20-20.1 and n 83e. Although Hogg states that the attorney general who
did not resign would have to support the Cabinet decision, it does not necessarily follow, as Roach
suggests, that this i  the same as saying that the attorney general could oppose the policy-in contrast
to merely remaining silent-after resigning.
11. Rosenberg, supra note 5 at 819-820 [emphasis added].
12. John LI J Edwards, The Attorney General, Politics and the Public Interest (London, UK: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1984) at 379 [Edwards, The AG], cited in Rosenberg, supra note 5 at 820 [emphasis
mine].
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general who is not a lawyer, as well as to ministers other than the attorney
general who happen to be lawyers.
I. Resignations from Cabinet
While there are no circumstances under which an attorney general would
be legally required to resign, there are a few situations in which he or
she would be expected to resign by convention or otherwise. The clear
convention is where Cabinet attempts to interfere in the attorney general's
conduct of criminal proceedings:
[A]lthough the Attorney General is a cabinet minister, he or she acts
independently of the cabinet in the exercise of the prosecution function.
This [constitutional] convention is now so firmly entrenched in the
Canadian political system that any deviation would likely lead to the
resignation of the Attorney General or would, at the very least, spark a
constitutional crisis. 3
While short of a convention, there is a consensus in the literature that an
attorney general should resign, or at least seriously consider resignation,
when Cabinet rejects his or her legal advice that a proposed bill or other
action would be unconstitutional. Edwards frames the mildest version
of this consensus, that this rejection "should lead the Attorney General
to question seriously his commitment to serve the Government as its
chief legal adviser."'4 Huscroft argues that the attorney general "should"
resign in these*circumstances.5 In the strongest take, Sossin describes
resignation as the attorney general's "obligation" where Cabinet rejects
advice of unconstitutionality.16 (Alternately, it has been proposed that
an attorney general could also respond to the rejection of advice of
unconstitutionality by litigating against the government-which would
13. Rosenberg, supra note 5 at 820, citing Edwards, The AG, supra note 12 at 379-388. See also
Krieger v Law Society of Alberta, 2002 SCC 65 at para 3, [2002] 3 SCR 372 [Krieger]: "It is a
constitutional principle that the Attorneys General of this country must act independently of partisan
concerns when exercising their delegated sovereign authority to initiate, continue or terminate
prosecutions."
14. J LI J Edwards, "The Attorney General and the Charter of Rights" in Robert J Sharpe, ed,
Charter Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) 45 at 53 [Edwards, "The AG & the Charter"]. See
also Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer," supra note 3 at 604: "In such a case [(rejection of
advice of unconstitutionality)], an Attorney General would have to weigh his or her own commitment
to the rule of law against his or her own interests in remaining in Cabinet." See also McAllister, supra
note 3 at 62-64, and Sterling & Mackay, supra note 3 at 898-902, neatly summarizing the relevant
literature.
15. Huscroft, "Advocate or Adjudicator," supra note 3 at 138, and Huscroft, "Duty & Discretion,"
supra note 3 at 794-795.
16. Lome Sossin, "Speaking Truth to Power? The Search for Bureaucratic Independence in Canada"
(2005) 55:1 UTLJ I at 45.
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be essentially equivalent to, or even more dramatic than, resignation.
17
Indeed, Roach refers to resignation and such litigation as the two "drastic
options" in that situation, and acknowledges that such litigation may well
result in the attorney general's dismissal.8) The case for resignation is
even stronger in the federal context, where the attorney general is required
by statute to inform the House of Commons if a bill is contrary to the
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms or the Canadian Bill ofRights,
and resignation might be preferable to making such a report.'9 A similar
argument for resignation would apply where Cabinet rejects legal advice
that a proposal is otherwise unlawful.20
However, it would be unlikely for an attorney general to give
such absolute advice that a proposal is unconstitutional, as opposed
to positioning a proposal on a spectrum between low-risk and high-
risk.2' Nonetheless, there is certainly some threshold level of risk that
equates with unconstitutionality, above which resignation is necessary
or appropriate and below which the attorney general may pursue other
options.22 At present, the federal department of justice reportedly uses a
"'no credible argument' or "manifestly unconstitutional" 23 threshold for
determining whether a bill is "inconsistent with" 24 the Charter. Similarly,
Huscroft has argued that resignation is appropriate only when "a bill is
17. See, e.g., Scott, "The AG & the Charter," supra note 3 at 197, discussing a then-unpublished
speech by John Edwards: "It has also been suggested that, in exceptional circumstances, the Attorney
General could use legal proceedings against one of his or her Cabinet colleagues to stop activity
that would contravene the Charter of Rights." See also Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer,"
supra note 3 at 608-609, citing Scott, "The AG & the Charter," supra note 3 and Edwards, "The AG
& the Charter," supra note 14 at 53: "'the extraordinary demonstration of the Attorney General's
independent status and independent responsibilities by way of active representation in the courts, in
his own person if that is necessary, to argue the case on behalf of the public interest."'
18. Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer," supra note 3 at 633.
19. See, e.g., Driedger, supra note 3 at 311: "The Government could not politically afford to put itself
in a position in which the Minister of Justice would resign over the issue or make an adverse report
against the Government in the House of Commons as required by section 3 of the Bill of Rights."
Hiebert has described this excerpt as Driedger "speculat[ing] that if cabinet insisted on approving a
bill that violated rights, the Minister of Justice would likely feel compelled to resign rather than risk
being put in the position of having to make a report to Parliament that the government knowingly was
introducing legislation inconsistent with rights": Hiebert, supra note 3 at 89.
20. See, e.g., Sterling, supra note 3 at 147 [emphasis in original]: "In extremis, the Attorney General
might resign if he or she believes that government action is being taken illegally or unconstitutionally."
21. See, e.g., Sterling & Mackay, supra note 3 at 901: "it is rare for the Attorney General, or his
or her constitutional lawyers, to opine that a particular piece of legislation is 'constitutional' or
Iunconstitutional.' Instead, they provide a risk analysis, based on existing case law, which assesses the
likelihood that the law would not be upheld due to a contravention of the Charter."
22. See, e.g., Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer," supra note 3 at 634-642, where Roach
discusses appropriate alternatives to resignation.
23. See Bond, supra note 3 at 384, 385, n 29; Alice Woolley, "The Lawyer as Advisor and the
Practice of the Rule of Law" (2014) 47:2 UBC L Rev 743 at 743-744.
24. DOJA, supra note 3, s 4.1.
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not even arguably consistent with the Charter-if, in other words, the
Attorney General considers that the government is repudiating its Charter
obligations."25 These are very high thresholds, and there can be reasonable
disagreement over what threshold is appropriate.
These rare situations should be contrasted with the more likely and less
problematic situation where Cabinet rejects the attorney general's policy
advice, or legal advice other than unconstitutionality or unlawfulness.
For example, Cabinet may not support the attorney general's proposed
reforms to the court system, or accept the attorney general's advice on
litigation strategy in a civil proceeding, such as pursuing a settlement.
Resignation would not be necessary in such circumstances.26 An attorney
general who feels strongly about such a matter may decide that resignation
is appropriate. I note, however, that Roach has criticized the distinction
between legal advice and policy advice as inconsistent with the role ofpolicy
considerations in the determination of Charter compliance.27 Thus, to be
more precise, the rejection of policy advice that goes to constitutionality
would be akin to rejection of legal advice of unconstitutionality.
Several other situations, though less common in the literature,
could also prompt a principled resignation. The attorney general might
resign because he or she had lost confidence in the prime minister. More
specifically, this could involve the attorney general losing confidence in the
prime minister as a leader, as could happen to any minister, or as a client,
which would be unique to the attorney general. For example, the attorney
general may feel obliged to disassociate himself from comments or actions
by other ministers that genuinely threaten respect for the administration of
justice. This could involve a minister publicly questioning the integrity of
the judiciary,2 or attempting to contact or influence a judge regarding an
ongoing proceeding.29
25. Huscroft, "Duty & Discretion," supra note 3 at 794-795. See also Huscroft, "Advocate or
Adjudicator," supra note 3 at 138 [emphasis in original]: "In my view, the Attorney General should
resign only if the government has rejected his or her advice that its proposed legislation is clearly
inconsistent with the Charter-if, in other words, the Attorney General considers that the proposed
legislation is not even arguably constitutional." For a critique of Huscroft's position, see Bond, supra
note 3 at 386-390.
26. See, e.g., Scott, "The AG & the Charter," supra note 3 at 193-195.
27. See Roach, "Revisited," supra note 3 at 35, critiquing Scott, "The AG & the Charter," supra note
3 at 196 and Scott, "Constancy & Change," supra note 3 at 126.
28. For example, Prime Minister Harper's 2015 criticism of Chief Justice McLachlin: see, e.g., Sean
Fine, "Harper, MacKay should apologize to Chief Justice McLachlin, commission says," The Globe
and Mail (25 July 2014), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>. Resignation was arguably more
appropriate than an apology for the Attorney General in this situation, particularly given the Prime
Minister's refusal to apologize.
29. It is clear that the minister who does so should certainly resign-consider, for example, the
1990 resignation of Sports Minister Jean Charest: see, e.g., "When-a minister calls a judge," Editorial,
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These situations of potential resignation are reinforced by the rules
of professional conduct, and specifically those on withdrawal from
representation. Withdrawal would presumably also mean resignation,0
as the attorney general would no longer be able to fulfill his duties.
Withdrawal from representation is mandatory where, among other things,
"a client persists in instructing the lawyer to act contrary to professional
ethics."'" Similarly, withdrawal is also mandatory for a "lawyer who is
employed or retained by an organization to act in a matter in which the
lawyer knows that the organization has acted, is acting or intends to act
dishonestly, fraudulently, criminally, or illegally... if the organization,
despite the lawyer's advice, continues with or intends to pursue the
proposed wrongful conduct.'3 2 These descriptions would apply, in the
context of an attorney general, where Cabinet rejects advice that a proposal
is unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful, or where there is interference
with the attorney general's decisions regarding criminal proceedings.
Withdrawal is permissible "[i]f there has been a serious loss of confidence
between the lawyer and the client,"33 which includes where "a lawyer is
deceived by his client, the client refuses to accept and act upon the lawyer's
advice on a significant point, [or] a client is persistently unreasonable or
uncooperative in a material respect."34 These descriptions would apply
where Cabinet rejects the attorney general's policy advice (or legal advice
other than unconstitutionality or unlawfulness), where the attorney general
has lost confidence in the prime minister, and where the attorney general
feels it necessary to dissociate himself from the actions of Cabinet or the
prime minister.
The Globe and Mail (25 January 1990) A6. An attorney general might feel obliged to resign if the
prime minister made such a call, and/or any minister made such a call despite the attorney general's
admonition not to do so.
30. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct, Ottawa: FLSC,
2014, r 3.2-8, commentary 5, online: FLSC <flsc.ca> [FLSC Model Code]: "In some but not all cases,
withdrawal means resigning from his or her position or relationship with the organization and not
simply withdrawing from acting in the particular matter." A withdrawing lawyer's firm would also
ordinarily withdraw from the representation. See ibid, r 3.7-9, commentary 1: "If the lawyer who is
discharged or withdraws is a member of a firm, the client should be notified that the lawyer and the
firm are no longer acting for the client." However, the attorney general's ministry or department, as
an entity, is inextricably linked to the government and cannot likewise withdraw. Thus, any other
lawyers involved in the matter, including the deputy attorney general, would presumably also have to
determine whether they must or should withdraw as well. Any replacement attorney general would
have to make the same determination.
31. lbid, r3.7-7(b).
32. Ibid, r.3.2-8(c). See also, e.g., Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer," supra note 3 at 610,
arguing that the attorney general has a broader responsibility than does a lawyer in private practice
"not to follow unlawful instructions."
33. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, ch 3.7-2.
34. lbid, r 3.7-2, commentary 1.
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Like other ministers, the attorney general might also resign as penance
for his own personal or professional misconduct, or as vicarious penance
of ministerial responsibility, i.e., for some failure or misconduct by his
ministry or department. However, these situations would seem unlikely to
invoke confidentiality or privilege, particularly because the rest of Cabinet
and the prime minister would be unlikely to object to the public ritual
including the identification of the wrongdoing. For this reason, I will not
discuss these further.
In summary, there are several principled bases on which an attorney
general must or might resign. The attorney general must resign if Cabinet
attempts to interfere in decisions regarding criminal proceedings, and
arguably must resign if Cabinet rejects his advice that a proposed action
would be unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful. In contrast, the attorney
general might resign where Cabinet rejects his policy or legal advice (other
than unconstitutionality or other unlawfulness), where he loses confidence
in the prime minister as leader, or where he wishes to disassociate himself
from actions by the prime minister or other ministers.
Few of these hypothetical situations have occurred. Many commentators
cite the example of Brian Smith's 1988 resignation as attorney general
for British Columbia.5 In his resignation speech, Smith emphasized the
special nature of the office and cited interference by the premier:
This is an office of great sensitivity and neutrality in the administration of
justice. I now find that I can no longer carry out my duties, as I clearly do
not have the support of the Premier and his office, who do not appreciate
the unique independence that is the cornerstone of the Attorney-General's
responsibilities in a free parliamentary democracy....
In removing myself from this office now it is my hope that I may protect
its unique independence. I believe that there is a strong danger that the
Premier wishes to'bring the conduct of the office of the Attorney-General
under closer control by his office and so weaken the independence of the
Attorney-General....
Only by stepping down, only by speaking out now, can I hope to prevent
a course which will weaken the independence and erode the tradition of
the office of the Attorney-General....
35. On Brian Smith's resignation, see Roach, "Revisited," supra note 3 at 21, n 94; Roach, "Not Just
the Government's Lawyer," supra note 3 at 633, n 88; see also Sterling & Mackay, supra note 3 at 901,
n 30; see also Sossin, supra note 16 at 45-46, quoting in part from Smith's resignation speech. But see
especially Rosenberg, supra note 5 at 819, n 19 [citation omitted]: "in fairness, the reasons for Smith's
resignation continue to be somewhat obscure and there exists a body of opinion that his resignation
was driven as much by politics as by concern for the Premier's interference in the Attorney General's
office." Thanks to Adam Dodek for bringing Smith's resignation to my attention.
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[Djuring my term of office I have tried to give sound advice. I have always
striven to protect he honesty and integrity of the administration....
For me to have acted differently and to have done what I was requested
to do would not only have dishonoured my office but also would have
placed in peril the office of the Premier. I explained my position on
several occasions to the Premier when those events occurred. I fervently
hoped that I had established and explained the importance of the
neutrality and independence of my office to the Premier. I now believe
that I have failed to make that impression....
But by speaking out now, and stepping down now, I may still deter these
plans and save the integrity of the office of the Attorney-General....
I am resigning as an act of honour.3 6
There have been suggestions that Smith also had other reasons for
resigning.37 Smith himself indicated that his resignation was prompted by
his pending likely replacement, although he objected specifically to the
identity of his likely successor.3"
The Smith situation can be contrasted with a more recent development.
In November 2014, Attorney General Andrew Swan of Manitoba resigned
from Cabinet, along with four other ministers, because of non-confidence
in the premier.39 While Swan's comments were not reported in the media,
the resigning finance minister was quoted, apparently on behalf of the five:
"'The Premier is no longer listening to our advice and you can't continue
in cabinet if that's [the case]."'4 There was no indication given that it was
Swan's legal advice, as opposed to policy advice, that was disregarded.
Having canvassed the situations in which an attorney general might
resign for principled reasons, I now turn to how the rules of professional
conduct would apply to her public disclosure of those reasons.
36. British Columbia, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative Assembly (Hansard), 34th Parl,
2nd Sess (28 June 1988) at 5498-5499 (Hon BR Smith) [Smith, Hansardl.
37.. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 5 at 819, n 19.
38. See Smith, Hansard, supra note 36 at 5498-5499:
[D]uring the past week, amid speculation of cabinet reorganization, I have had a chance to
review some of the comments that have been made by the Premier and others concerning
who might occupy the office ofAttorney-General.... 1 can only conclude that it is because
of the way that I independently carried out my duties that I am slated to be removed from
those duties.
39. See, e.g., Joe Friesen, "Manitoba Premier Selinger appoints five new ministers after revolt," The
Globe and Mail (4 November 2014), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>.
40. Ibid [brackets in original].
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II. The attorney general on resignation
I begin by assessing the obligations of the attorney general solely as
lawyer to Cabinet and the prime minister. I then consider how additional
obligations, still as a lawyer, might complicate the situation.
1. As legal advisor to Cabinet
The attorney general is commonly referred to as "[the] Chief Law Officer
of the Crown,"'" or more casually as "the government's lawyer.42 (Other
descriptions in statute are "the official legal adviser of the Governor
General and the legal member of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada,
'43
or "the Law Officer of the Executive Council."' ) She and her department
or ministry provide legal advice to ministers and their departments or
ministries.4 5 Thus, the attorney general is, among other things, the lawyer
to Cabinet,46 and is bound by client confidentiality: "A lawyer at all times
must hold in strict confidence all information concerning the business and
affairs of a client acquired in the course of the professional relationship,"
subject to limited exceptions.47 The obligation of confidentiality continues
after the termination of the relationship.48 Some factors relevant to
resignation, such as the prime minister or Cabinet's rejection of legal
41. See, e.g., Ontario v Criminal Lawyers 'Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43 at para 35, [2013] 3
SCR 3. See also Scott, "Constancy & Change," supra note 3 at 122: "It is understood in our province
that the attorney general is first and foremost the chief law officer of the Crown." See also, e.g., Roach,
"Not Just the Government's Lawyer," supra note 3 at 601, 639, 640. See also Krieger, supra note 13
at para 25, where the Supreme Court refers to her as "the official legal advisor to the Crown."
42. See, e.g., McAllister, supra note 3 at 50: "the Attorney General is the chief law officer of the
Crown or, as it is often put, the government's lawyer." (Note that McAllister makes this statement in
the context of distinguishing between the roles of attorney general and minister ofjustice at the federal
level.) But see Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer," supra note 3.
43. DOJA, supra note 3, s 4. For present purposes, I do not distinguish between the minister of
justice and the attorney general.
44. Ministry of the Attorney GeneralAct, RSO 1990, c M.17, s 5(a) [MAGA].
45. See, e.g., DOJA, supra note 3, s 4(a): "see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance
with law"; s 4(c): "generally advise the Crown on all matters of law referred to the Minister by the
Crown"; s 5(b): "shall advise the heads of the several departments ofthe Government on all matters of
law connected with such departments." See also s 5(d): "shall have the regulation and conduct of all
litigation for or against the Crown or any department, in respect of any subject within the authority or
jurisdiction of Canada." For parallel provisions at the provincial level, see, e.g., MA GA, supra note 44,
ss 5(b), (e), (g), (h). See also McAllister, supra note 3 at 50; Mark J Freiman, "Convergence of Law
and Policy and the Role of the Attorney General" (2002) 16 SCLR (2d) 335 at 338-339.
46. The formal distinction between the Cabinet and the Governor in Council is not relevant for my
purposes.
47. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 3.3-1. See also British Columbia (Securities Commission) v
CWM, 2003 BCCA 244 at para 45, 226 DLR (4th) 393 [CWM], leave to appeal to SCC refused, 29847
(22 January 2004): "There is no doubt that lawyers are under an obligation to keep confidential all
documents and other communications made to them by their clients."
48. See FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 3.3- 1, commentary 3: "The duty survives the professional
relationship and continues indefinitely after the lawyer has ceased to act for the client, whether or not
differences have arisen between them."
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advice (and the nature of that advice), would not only be confidential, but
also covered by solicitor-client privilege.
As set out above, there are several principled reasons for which an
attorney general must or might resign. However, regardless of the reason(s)
for resigning, and thus for ending the solicitor-client relationship, there
is no allowance under the rules of professional conduct for the attorney
general-or any other lawyer-to publicly state the specific reason.
None of the recognized exceptions would apply: authorization by the
client; requirement by law, the courts, or the law society49; future harm0 ;
defence against allegations of negligence or malpractice or misconduct";
fee collection5 2; solicitation of legal or ethical advice53; or addressing
conflicts of interest.54 (Note however that the New Brunswick Code of
Professional Conduct does recognize an additional mandatory exception to
confidentiality "when the national interest makes disclosure imperative."55
However, in the absence of reported disciplinary or court decisions on this
rule, the intended scope of the exception is unclear.)A more amorphous and
intangible harm, such as harm to the office of the attorney general, would
not qualify. In particular, the exception for future harm is narrow and has
a high threshold, applying only "when the lawyer believes on reasonable
grounds that there is an imminent risk of death or serious bodily harm,
and disclosure is necessary to prevent the death or harm."56 In addition,
the confidentiality exceptions generally require that the lawyer "must not
disclose more information than is required."57 Even if the resignation is
49. lbid, r 3.3-3.
50. lbid, r 3.3-1. See also r 5.6-3 on the security of court facilities. Note however that that rule
requires disclosure, whereas the future harm exception only allows it.
51. Ibid, r 3.3-4.
52. Ibid, r 3.3-5.
53. Ibid, r 3.3-6.
54. Ibid, r 3.3-7.
55. Law Society of New Brunswick, Code of Professional Conduct, Fredericton: LSNB, 2003,
ch 5, commentary 8(c), online: LSNB <lawsociety-barreau.nb.ca> [LSNB, Professional Conduct],
discussed in Adam M Dodek, Solicitor-Client Privilege (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at
paras 8.54-8.55 [Dodek, Solicitor-Client Privilege], and in Michel Proulx & David Layton, Ethics and
Canadian CriminalLaw (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 252-253. Dodek and Proulx & Layton are quite
critical of this exception. (Thanks to Jeanette Bosschart for bringing the Proulx & Layton passage to
my attention. Note that this discussion is omitted from the second edition of Layton & Proulx: David
Layton & Michel Proulx, Ethics and Criminal Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015). Note as well
that this exception in the New Brunswick Code is mandatory, not permissive.)
56. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 3.3-3 [emphasis added]. Some jurisdictions merely refer to
disclosure being "necessary to prevent a crime that involves violence": see, e.g., LSNB, Professional
Conduct, supra note 55, ch 5, commentary 8(b): mandatory not permissive. There is a corresponding
exception to solicitor-client privilege where "an identifiable individual or group is in imminent danger
of death or serious bodily harm": Smith v Jones, [1999] 1 SCR 455 at para 85, 169 DLR (4th) 485.
57. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, ch 3.3-3-3.3-5.
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for reasons unrelated to the attorney general's role as lawyer, such as the
rejection of pure policy advice or for non-confidence in the prime minister
as leader (and not as client), the attorney general by resigning is still
withdrawing from all of his roles, including legal representation. Thus,
although the reason for resignation would not be covered by solicitor-
client privilege, it would be covered by confidentiality.
While the attorney general, as a lawyer, is certainly bound by the rules
of professional conduct, including those on confidentiality, it is unclear
and uncertain whether he could be disciplined by his respective law society
for their breach. The rules explicitly provide that they apply to lawyers in
public office: "A lawyer who holds public office must, in the discharge of
official duties, adhere to standards of conduct as high as those required
of a lawyer engaged in the practice of law."58 However, a 1967 precedent
from Quebec held that the attorney general cannot be disciplined for
actions taken in the course of his professional duties.9 Similar disciplinary
immunity is granted in Ontario under the Law Society Act, which provides
that "[n]o person who is or has been the Attorney General for Ontario is
subject to any proceedings of the Society or to any penalty imposed under
this Act for anything done by him or her while exercising the functions of
such office. ' 6° Arguably, disclosing the reason for resignation is properly
considered conduct after holding office, but the strength of such an
argument is uncertain. An argument could also be made that federalism
grounds require such protection for federal attorneys general from the
jurisdiction of provincial law societies.61 Moreover, any remarks made
in the House of Commons or the legislatures would be protected under
parliamentary privilege from disciplinary proceedings.62 Thus, for better
58. Ibid, r 7.4.
59. Barreau (Montreal) c Wagner, [1968] BR 235 (BR). Note that this decision was not followed
in Kimmerly v Lcnv Society (Yukon) (1987), 3 YR 54 (SC). (See Andrew Flavelle Martin, "Legal
Ethics versus Political Practices: The Application of the Rules of Professional Conduct to Lawyer-
Politicians" (2013) 91:1 Can Bar Rev 1 at 18, n 87.)
60. Lav Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8, s 13(3). For discussion of this provision, see, e.g., John LI J
Edwards, "The Office of Attorney General: New Levels of Public Expectations and Accountability"
in Philip C Stenning, ed, Accountability for Criminal Justice: Selected Essays (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1995) 294 at 303 [Edwards, "Expectations and Accountability"].
61. I have previously dismissed this issue of state or provincial disciplinary jurisdiction over federal
lawyers as a quirk of federalism (as opposed to a problem), at least in the context of politicians who are
not lawyers: Martin, supra note 59 at 20. As I noted there, in Krieger, supra note 13, the Supreme Court
rejected the suggestion that provincial law societies do not have jurisdiction over federal prosecutors
(Martin, supra note 59 at 20, citing Krieger, supra note 13 at para 56). Moreover, as discussed below,
the attorney general is not required to be a lawyer, and so a lawyer wanting to serve as federal attorney
general unbound by such concerns could resign his licence. Nonetheless, Canadian courts have yet to
rule on this point.
62. See Canada (House of Commons) v Vaid, 2005 SCC 30, [2005] 1 SCR 667.
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or worse,63 an attorney general is unlikely to face professional discipline
for publicly disclosing his reasons for resignation. However, the rules of
professional conduct nonetheless apply.
2. As legal advisor to both Cabinet and legislature
A complicating factor for this analysis, however, is that attorneys
general also have obligations to provide legal advice to Parliament or the
legislatures.64 While this duty is not explicitly specified in the statutes
setting out the powers and duties of the attorney general, those statutes
incorporate the powers and duties of the attorney general of England,
65
which included this duty.66 However, this role is not well characterized,67
the exception at the federal level being the minister of justice's statutory
reporting duties to the House of Commons where government bills or
regulations do not comply with the Bill of Rights or the Charter.61 That
reporting does seem contrary to the attorney general's obligations to
Cabinet.69 Huscroft has argued that the attorney general's responsibility
63. Adam Dodek has suggested that this is a good thing, i.e., that law societies should not regulate
the conduct of lawyers in public office: see Adam Dodek, "Public Office and Standards of Conduct"
(April-May 2013) National Magazine, online: Canadian Bar Association <www.nationalmagazine.
ca/Articles/Recent4/Publicoffice and standards of conduct.aspx> [Dodek, "Public Office"]. For a
contrary view, although specifically dealing with lawyer-politicians other than the attorney general, see
Martin, supra note 59. With reference to s 13(3) of the Law Society Act, supra note 60, see Edwards,
"Expectations and Accountability," supra note 60 at 303: "In my opinion, the Ontario provision cited
above, or any parallel enactments, should be totally removed from the statute book."
64. See, e.g., Huscroft, "Advocate or Adjudicator," supra note 3 at 128:
[T]he Attorney General is also the Legislature's lawyer, and is responsible for the drafting of
private members' Bills. Similarly, the Attorney General provides advice to the Cabinet, but
is also responsible for the provision of advice to the Legislature and legislative committees
about proposed legislation. In these and other regards, it is clear that the Attorney General's
duties as Chief Law Officer of the Crown extend beyond the government to the legislature
as a whole.
See also The Honourable R Roy McMurtry, "The Office of the Attorney General" in Derek Mendes da
Costa, ed, The Cambridge Lectures: Selected Papers Based upon Lectures Delivered at the Cambridge
Conference of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, 1979 (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981)
I at 1: "This responsibility to give legal advise to the legislature remains part of my role in Ontario
even today." Note that, for my purposes, the formal distinction between a legislative assembly and
a legislature (a legislative assembly plus the Lieutenant Governor) is not relevant. Similarly, at the
federal level, the formal distinction between the House of Commons and Senate, on the one hand, and
Parliament (the House of Commons and the Senate plus the Governor General/Queen) is not relevant.
65. DOJA, supra note 3, s 5(a); MAGA, supra note 44, s 5(d).
66. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 13 at para 27: "As in England, [attorneys general] serve as Law
Officers to their respective legislatures."
67. See, e.g., Huscroft, "Advocate or Adjudicator," supra note 3 at 128, n 12, citing Edwards, The
AG, supra note 12 at 217-218: "Although, as Edwards notes, the extent of the Attorney General's duty
to the Legislature is not clear, and has seldom been discussed."
68. Bill of Rights, supra note 3, s 3; DOJA, supra note 3, s 4.1; Charter, supra note 3. For a detailed
critique and case study, see Bond, supra note 3.
69. See, e.g., Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer," supra note 3 at 622-623:
An Attorney General acting as the government's Minister of Justice may be reluctant
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to support government legislation in court comes from his "constitutional
duty to the legislative branch."7°
If the attorney general is also the lawyer to the legislature-certainly
at the federal level with respect to rights-violating government bills and
regulations, and possibly for other matters and at the provincial level-
then conceivably, at least for some matters, the attorney general is jointly
retained by Cabinet and the legislature. As such, in those matters there
can be no confidentiality as between Cabinet and the legislature.7' Thus
the attorney general could arguably, in some circumstances, advise the
legislature of the reason for his resignation. However, a distinction could
be made between disclosing something to the legislature, which could be
done confidentially, and disclosing something in the legislature, which is
necessarily public. The provisions on reporting bills and regulations that
are contrary to the Bill of Rights or the Charter conflate the two, and any
reporting to the legislature is clearly understood as meaning reporting in
the legislature.72 But as a matter of professional conduct under the rule
on confidentiality, the distinction is important: the information would
still be confidential to Cabinet and the legislature as against all others,
including the public. Thus the public disclosure of the information would
violate that joint confidentiality. Under this approach, the attorney general
would be able to confidentially share the reason for his resignation with
the legislature.73 However, as described above, the attorney general who
disclosed the reasons in the legislature would be immune to disciplinary
proceedings under parliamentary privilege.
3. As both legal advisor to Cabinet and "guardian of the public
interest"
A different complicating factor for the analysis is the role of the attorney
general as the "guardian of the public interest."74 The role has been
to report that a bill is inconsistent with the Charter for reasons relating to respecting
solicitor-client privilege, Cabinet confidences, and solidarity. Nevertheless, the Minister
of Justice does have an explicit statutory duty to report on such inconsistencies and this
explicit statutory duty should prevail.
70. Huscrofl, "Advocate or Adjudicator," supra note 3 at 143, as quoted e.g. in Roach, "Not Just the
Government's Lawyer," supra note 3 at 607.
71. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 3.4-5(b).
72. Bill ofRights, supra note 3, s 3 ("shall report any such inconsistency to the House of Commons");
DOJA, supra note 3, s 4.1 ("shall report any such inconsistency to the House of Commons").
73. It is unclear who represents the legislature in these circumstances-presumably the Speaker.
74. See, e.g., McAllister, supra note 3 at 49; see also Huscroft, "Duty & Discretion," supra note 3
at 797, identifying this as a "term popularized by John Edwards." See also Gordon F Gregory, "The
Attorney-General in Government" (1987) 36 UNBLJ 59 at 64: "The Attorney-General also has a role
in civil issues before the courts, in which he acts not as counsel to government but fulfills his own
independent role as what is sometimes referred to as 'guardian of the public interest.' In that capacity
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defined with reference to the dual focuses described above-the attorney
general in litigation on behalf of the government and in advising on the
constitutionality ofbills and regulations'-as well as the more longstanding
roles of seeking injunctions in the public interest against nuisances and
non-compliance with the law.76 It is unclear what the phrase might mean in
other contexts.77 Indeed, Edwards noted that "the parliamentary debates,
publicjournals and newspapers of the respective Commonwealth countries
exhibit little of substance by way of public explanation of the Attorney-
General's special responsibilities as the avowed guardian of the public
interest.""8 Courts have applied the term in relation to functions such as
the regulation of the legal profession by the law society,79 and the pursuit
of complaints of judicial misconduct.80 Huscroft has criticized the phrase
he may apply, and is ordinarily extended the right, to intervene ex officio in private litigation."
75. See especially Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer," supra note 3; McAllister, supra
note 3.
76. See, e.g., Sterling & Mackay, supra note 3 at 914-922. See also John LI J Edwards, The Law
Officers of the Crown: A Study of the Offices of Attorney-General and Solicitor-General of England
with an Account of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions of England (London, UK: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1964) at 286 [Edwards, Crown's Law Officers], as described by Huscroft, "Duty &
Discretion," supra note 3 at 797.
77. See, e.g., Huscroft, "Duty & Discretion," supra note 3 at 797, citing the 1964 description of that
term as "'wide-ranging and still somewhat undefined' from Edwards, Crown 's Law Officers, supra
note 76 at 286.
78. John LI J Edwards, "The Charter, Government and the Machinery of Justice" (1987) 36 UNBLJ
41 at 43.
79. See the Law Society Act, supra note 60, s 13(l): "The Attorney General for Ontario shall serve as
the guardian of the public interest in all matters within the scope of this Act or having to do in any way
with the practice of law in Ontario or the provision of legal services in Ontario." This provision may
seem fairly explicit, but see LaBelle v Lav Society of Upper Canada (2001), 56 OR (3d) 413 (CA)
[LaBelle], affg 52 OR (3d) 398 (Sup Ct), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 29120 (5 December 2002).
In LaBelle at para 4, the Court of Appeal expressed "reservations about his [(the motion judge's)]
interpretation" of the provision:
It is sufficient to dispose of this appeal to find, as we do, that the Attorney General is not
charged by the Act with the responsibility to investigate complaints against lawyers in this
province. That role has been given by the legislature to the Law Society of Upper Canada.
The function assigned to the Attorney General by s. 13 of the Act-to serve as guardian of
the public interest-does not obligate the Attorney General to direct such investigations or
to cause them to be directed, nor does it confer upon the appellant, in the circumstances of
the present case, a cause of action against he Attorney General for failing to direct or to
compel the direction of such investigations.
80. See, e.g., Mackin v New Brunswick (Judicial Council) (1987), 82 NBR (2d) 203 at para 31, 44
DLR (4th) 730 (CA), Ryan JA, dissenting:
The Attorney General is the guardian of the public interest. He, above all ministers, is
charged with responsibility for the administration ofjustice. It is his duty to concern himself
with matters of a public nature because the people of this province have a continuing
interest in seeing that laws are obeyed; and that all officers of the law, within the different
levels of the justice system, do not abrogate their responsibilities or defy the tenets of
their appointment or position. In matters related purely to the administration ofjustice, the
Attorney General, because of the strength of his office, is an appropriate person to bring
his concerns about the conduct of any provincial court judge, before the Judicial Council.
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"'guardian and protector of the public interest"' as "misleading," because
"[t]here is no independent, value-neutral public interest to be protected,"
at least in the Charter context.8' However, in doing so he quoted with
approval Gerard Carney's position that "it would be more accurate to
describe the Attorney as a guardian of the administration of justice.
'82
Adam Dodek has argued that the "'guardian of the public interest"' role,
alongside the concept of the attorney general as the "'defender of the
[r]ule of [l]aw,"' 3 supports what he argues is a "higher duty of government
lawyers as custodians of the rule of law."' However, Roach and Dodek
largely identify these special responsibilities as inward-looking. Roach
describes the attorney general as "defender of the rule of law within
government,"85 and identifies the publicly visible options of resignation
and litigation as a last resort.86 Similarly, Dodek states that "[g]overnment
lawyers are involved in protecting the rule of lawfrom the inside.87
Revisiting the above hierarchy of reasons for an attorney general's
resignation, the question is this: are there any actions that are so wrongful
and harmful to the public interest, the rule of law, or public confidence in the
administration of justice, that the attorney general should not only advise
against them, refuse to follow associated instructions, and resign, but also
publicly announce and denounce those actions? This would seem to be what
Rosenberg and Edwards are implying where Cabinet attempts to interfere
with prosecutorial decisions.88 Similarly, Allan Hutchinson has argued that
government lawyers are not only "under a less onerous obligation to keep
work-related communications and information confidential" but "might
well have a professional duty in some circumstances to disclose publicly
certain communications and information. '89 Similarly, Dodek has argued
that governments should be more willing to waive privilege.90
81. Huscroft, "Duty & Discretion," supra note 3 at 797, 798.
82. Gerard Carney, "Comment: The Role of the Attorney General" (1997) 9:1 Bond L Rev 1 at 6
[emphasis in original].
83. See, e.g., Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer," supra note 3. See Dodek, "Intersection,"
supra note I where he mentions these two roles together at 18 and discusses them at 18-20. Dodek
cites these phrases to, inter alia, Edwards and Roach. See also Morris & Nishikawa, supra note I at
175, using the phrase "guardian of the rule of law."
84. Dodek, "Intersection," supra note I at 18, 25.
85. Roach, "Not Just the Government's Lawyer," supra note 3 at 600 [emphasis added].
86. Ibid at 633.
87. Dodek, "Intersection," supra note I at 23 [emphasis added].
88. See Rosenberg, supra note 11 and Edwards, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
89. Allan C Hutchinson, "'In the Public Interest': The Responsibilities and Rights of Government
Lawyers" (2008) 46:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 105 at 118.
90. Dodek, "Intersection," supra note I at 44, 45.
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Although any potential abrogation of confidentiality has a serious
impact on the client, the solicitor-client relationship, and the quality of
legal advice provided91-and it would be particularly worrisome were
Cabinet hesitant to obtain legal advice-the recognized exceptions
discussed above demonstrate that such an impact is acceptable in some
circumstances. Given these exceptions to confidentiality, including public
safety, one could compellingly argue that making public the reason for
resignation serves the public interest in defending the rule of law. Indeed,
Smith's resignation speech seems to make this implication. The fact that
the situation has almost never arisen suggests that the absence of such an
exception in the rules of professional conduct should not be determinative.
As stated in the preface to the FLSC Model Code, "[s]ome circumstances
that raise ethical considerations may be sufficiently unique that the
guidance in a rule or commentary may not answer the issue or provide the
required direction."92 Where the government is clearly acting unlawfully,
i.e., refusing advice of clear unconstitutionality or attempting to interfere
with the attorney general's prosecutorial discretion, such a disclosure could
arguably be an ethical obligation instead of an ethical violation. That is,
the two situations that arguably require an attorney general's resignation
are the situations in which disclosing the reasons for resignation is most
defensible. Nonetheless, presumably the attorney general would, as
with other exceptions to confidentiality, be required to disclose only as
much information as necessary.93 A corresponding exception could be
recognized to solicitor-client privilege.94 Arguably, a third situation also
makes disclosure defensible: where the attorney general feels it necessary,
as a lawyer, to disassociate himself from the actions of the prime minister
or Cabinet that threaten public confidence in the administration ofjustice.
91. See, e.g., Smith v Jones, supra note 56 at para 46, Cory J discussing the parallel importance of
solicitor-client privilege:
Clients seeking advice must be able to speak freely to their lawyers secure in the knowledge
that what they say will not be divulged without their consent....The privilege is essential if
sound legal advice is to be given in every field... .Without this privilege clients could never
be candid and furnish all the relevant information that must be provided to lawyers if they
are to properly advise their clients.
Consider also the newly recognized principle of fundamental justice, "the lawyer's duty of commitment
to the client's cause": Canada (AG) v Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2015 SCC 7 at paras 8,
[2015] 31 SCR 401. Public disclosure of the attorney general's reasons for resignation would appear
to be inconsistent with such commitment.
92. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30 at Preface.
93. lbid, rr 3.3-3-3.3-5: "must not disclose more information than is required."
94. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that the categories of exceptions to privilege are
not closed: Solosky v R, [1980] 1 SCR 821 at 836.
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It might seem risky for an attorney general to unilaterally claim
this unrecognized exception to confidentiality, but as described above
professional discipline is unlikely if not impossible. It is also unrealistic to
expect the law societies to amend their respective rules to address such a
rare situation. The assertion and assessment of such an exception could, in
itself and regardless of the outcome, serve the public interest.95
The difficulty with identifying this previously unrecognized exception,
however, is how it would apply in less extreme situations. Given the
narrowness of the existing exceptions, especially that for future harm or
public safety,96 a similarly high threshold and narrow scope would seem
appropriate and necessary for any new exception. Thus, in the situations
where an attorney general might resign-where Cabinet rejects advice of
only possible, not certain, unconstitutionality, or policy advice or legal
advice not going to constitutionality or unlawfulness, or the attorney
general loses confidence in the prime minister as leader-the attorney
general would not be justified in violating confidentiality to disclose his
reasons for resignation.
III. The non-lawyer attorney general on resignation from Cabinet
It is generally accepted that the attorney general, although typically a
lawyer, is not required to be a lawyer.97 While the effectiveness of such an
attorney general has been questioned," the legality of such an appointment
has recently been confirmed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal.99
95. Without encouraging illegality, I do note that such a test case would appear to be ethical: see
FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 3.2-7, commentary 4.
96. Ibid, r 3.3-3.
97. See, e.g., Huscroft, "Advocate or Adjudicator," supra note 3 at 134 [footnotes omitted]: "There
is no requirement that a Canadian Attorney General be a lawyer, and there is ample precedent for the
appointment of non-lawyers as Attorneys General, even when such appointments were not made of
necessity." See also Dodek, Solicitor-Client Privilege, supra note 55 at paras 4.28-4.34.
98. See, e.g., Huscroft, "Advocate or Adjudicator," supra note 3 at 135 [emphasis added]:
[T]he increased importance of litigation decisions made by Attorneys General in the
Charter era raises real concerns about the appropriateness of the political Attorney General
model. Those concerns are in my view heightened when it comes to the appointment of
non-lawyers to the position of Attorney General.
See also Smith's resignation speech-Smith, Hansard, supra note 36 at 5498:
Clearly the Premier believes that this office can be well filled by someone who does not
have legal training. This observation is hard to accept when there are four members of the
government caucus who have legal training. I know from my experience that the Attorney-
General requires considerable legal and constitutional sensibility in giving advice to
government, or else the Attorney-General will simply be repeating, without understanding,
the legal advice of others.
99. Askin v Lasv Society of British Columbia, 2013 BCCA 233, 363 DLR (4th) 706 [Askin], aff'g
2012 BCSC 895, [2012] BCJ No 1216 (QL), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 35463 (7 November
2013). This was an (unsuccessful) petition for judicial review of the Law Society's determination
that it did not have jurisdiction over the appointee for practicing law without a licence. This case is
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Specifically, the court held that provincial legislation, including the
Attorney General Act, the Legal Profession Act, and the Queen ' Counsel
Act did not limit the Crown prerogative to appoint Cabinet members,
including the attorney general.'00 The court also held that the provincial
Interpretation Act, and specifically the provision that "[i]f in an enactment
power is given to a person to do or enforce the doing of an act or thing,
all the powers that are necessary to enable the person to do or enforce
the doing of the act or thing are also deemed to be given,"'01 "gives the
Attorney General and her deputy (and designates) the necessary powers to
perform the duties required under the Attorney General Act."' 1 2 While the
decision turns on specific provisions of B.C. legislation, corresponding
legislation in other jurisdictions would be to similar effect.
0 3
It is thus relevant to consider whether confidentiality or privilege would
prevent a non-lawyer attorney general from publicly stating the reason for
her resignation. In order to do so, it is first necessary to determine the
status of the non-lawyer attorney general.
There appear to be three possible views on this question. Dodek has
argued that because the non-lawyer attorney general is not a lawyer, her
advice is not protected by solicitor-client privilege. 4 In doing so, he
relies on the Supreme Court's 1927 adoption of Wigmore's criteria for that
privilege, and specifically the requirement that advice be provided by "a
professional legal adviser."'0 5 Although Dodek does not explicitly address
discussed in Adam Dodek, "The Curious Case of the Non-Lawyer Attorney General: White Tiger of
the Legal System" (29 May 2013), Slaw (blog), online: <www.slaw.ca/2013/05/29/the-curious-case-
of-the-non-lawyer-attorney-general-white-tiger-of-the-legal-system/> [Dodek, "Slaw 1"], although
Dodek focuses on the application judge's reasons. See also Adam Dodek, "Does Solicitor-Client
Privilege Apply to an Attorney-General Who Is Not a Lawyer?" (6 August 2013), Slaw (blog), online:
<www.slaw.ca/2013/08/06/does-solicitor-client-privilege-apply-to-an-attorney-genera-who-is-nt-a-
lawyer/> [Dodek, "Slaw II"]; Dodek, Solicitor-Client Privilege, supra note 55 at para 4.31.
100. Askin, supra note 99 at paras 16 and 51; Attorney General Act, RSBC 1996, c 22; Legal
Profession Act, SBC 1998, c 9; Queen's Counsel Act, RSBC 1996, c 393. The petitioner also argued
(unsuccessfully) that the Queen's CounselAct required the attorney general not only to be a lawyer but
to have five years' membership in the provincial bar: Askin, supra note 99 at paras 11, 29, 46-47.
101. Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238, s 27(2).
102. Askin, supra note 99 at para 45, citing Interpretation Act, supra note 101, s 27. In respect of the
deputy minister and other designates, the Court also relied on s 23(l) (authorizing a deputy minister
and other designates to act on a minister's behalf). 1
103. See, e.g., MAGA, supra note 44, s 5 (functions of the attorney general); Legislation Act, 2006,
SO 2006, c 21, Schedule F, s 78 ("If power to do or to enforce the doing of a thing is conferred on a
person, all necessary incidental powers are included").
104. Dodek, "Slaw II," supra note 99. See also Dodek, Solicitor-Client Privilege, supra note 55 at
paras 4.33-4.34.
105. Howley v R, [1927] SCR 529 at 533-534, citing John T McNaughton, ed, Wiginore on Evidence:
Evidence in Trials at Common Law, revised ed (Toronto: Little, Brown & Co, 1961) vol 8 at 554, cited
in Dodek, "Slaw II," supra note 99.
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confidentiality, presumably the same reasoning applies-if the adviser is
not a lawyer, there can be no lawyer's obligation of confidentiality.0 6
John Gregory, in contrast, has argued that solicitor-client privilege
would apply to the advice because the non-lawyer attorney general is
acting as a "conduit" for that advice from other lawyers.07 Gregory's
position is attractive, given that the "channel of communication" extension
of solicitor-client privilege has been recognized at common law: "where
the third party serves as a channel of communication between the client
and solicitor, communications to or from the third party by the client or
solicitor will be protected by the privilege as long as those communications
meet the criteria for the existence of the privilege."'0 8 While Gregory
does not specifically address confidentiality, his reasoning suggests that it
would apply at a minimum to the lawyers providing the advice and would
not be diminished because the advice was transmitted by a non-lawyer
third party. It is unclear whether the non-lawyer attorney general would,
however, be bound by this confidentiality, and there is no reason to think
the respective law society would somehow have jurisdiction over that non-
lawyer.
In my view, a third position is preferable: the non-lawyer, by virtue
of his appointment as attorney general, is uniquely entitled to practise law
without membership in a law society. This entitlement would only apply
to the exercise of the functions of the office and necessarily comes from
the royal prerogative to select an attorney general and that appointee's
performance of official duties. This view is consistent with the decision
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, and specifically the remedial
implication that the attorney general be given the authority to perform
106. Dodek, "Slaw II," supra note 99. Dodek does address three other kinds of privilege and argues
that they would be applicable: "Much of the legal advice that a non-lawyer Attorney General provides
will be the subject of other privileges such as: crown privilege, litigation privilege and prosecutorial
discretion." See also Dodek, Solicitor-Client Privilege, supra note 55 at para 4.33.
107. John Gregory (6 Aug 2013 at 8:00 AM), comment on Dodek, "Slaw 11", supra note 99. Gregory
is General Counsel, Justice Development Policy Branch, Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario),
but his comment was clearly not made in a professional capacity.
108. General Accident Assurance Co v Chrusz (1999), 45 OR (3d) 321 at 352 (CA), Doherty JA
(dissenting on other grounds, but Rosenberg & Carthy JJA concurring on this point). See also the
resignation speech of Brian Smith, who suggests that the non-lawyer attorney general could be no
more than a conduit: "I know from my experience that the Attomey-General requires considerable
legal and constitutional sensibility in giving advice to government, or else the Attorney-General will
simply be repeating, without understanding, the legal advice of others." (Smith, Hansard, supra note
36 at 5498 [emphasis added]). Dodek argues that this extension "is a restrictive one which should
be applied to individuals but will have limited application to clients who are not individuals (i.e.,
partnerships, associations, corporations and governments)": Dodek, Solicitor-Client Privilege, supra
note 55 at para 6.21 [emphasis added].
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those duties."9 On this view, solicitor-client privilege would apply and
could be claimed by Cabinet, whereas confidentiality would apply only
nominally-while it would be appropriate for the resigning non-lawyer
attorney general to protect confidentiality, the law societies would have
no enforcement jurisdiction over that person. Oddly, this functionally
reverses the typical rule that confidentiality is broader than privilege."I
Thus, under any of these three views, the non-lawyer attorney general
may at most nominally be expected to honour confidentiality. Under two
of these views, solicitor-client privilege would nonetheless apply.
IV. Lawyers with other portfolios on resignation from Cabinet
Having considered how the rules of professional conduct constrain the
resigning lawyer and non-lawyer attorneys general, it is appropriate
to briefly address how those rules apply to other resigning members of
Cabinet who happen to be lawyers. As mentioned above, the rules of
professional conduct explicitly apply to lawyers in public office,"' including
those politicians who happen to be lawyers."2 To address the issue of
confidentiality on resignation, it is however necessary to determine which
of those rules apply to these lawyers."3 A non-practicing lawyer does not
have a client and is not in a solicitor-client relationship, and thus cannot
have responsibilities to a client" 4; as she is presumably not marketing
109. This is also consistent with another comment on Dodek's position: "If a non-lawyer AG requires
a non-disclosure privilege equivalent to what a lawyer AG would have in order to allow the AG to
perform the AG's function properly, that privilege will be found to exist by the courts if it does not
already exist by statute." (David Cheifetz (6 Aug 2013 at 4:09 PM), comment on Dodek, "Slaw II,"
supra note 99.) Cheifetz is a litigator and author in BC.
110. See, e.g., FLSC Model Code, supra note 30 at r 3.3-1, commentary 2:
This rule [(on confidentiality)] must be distinguished from the evidentiary rule of lawyer
and client privilege, which is also a constitutionally protected right, concerning oral or
documentary communications passing between the client and the lawyer. The ethical rule
is wider and applies without regard to the nature or source of the information or the fact
that others may share the knowledge.
See also CWM, supra note 47 at para 45: "There is no doubt that lawyers are under an obligation to
keep confidential all documents and other communications made to them by their clients, but not all
such communications are subject to solicitor-client privilege and a claim of privilege does not convert
non-privileged documents into privileged documents."
11l. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 7.4.
112. See Martin, supra note 59. See also Dodek, "Public Office," supra note 63.
113. This question is briefly considered in Martin, supra note 59 at 30-34, with particular attention
to the rules on integrity (FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 2.1-2), encouraging respect for the
administration ofjustice (r 5.6-1), and protecting fair trial rights (r 7.5-2). At 32-33 1 also raised the
possibility that the rules on undertakings could apply to campaign promises, those on advertising to
campaign advertisements, and those on responsibility for staff to political staff (rr 7.2-11, 4-2-1,6.1-
1). At 34, I described the rule on civility (r 7.2-1) as "[t]he elephant in the room for any discussion of
the applicability of the rules of ethics to lawyer-politicians."
114. See ibid, r 3.1-3.7.
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legal services, the rules on marketing do not apply."5 (However, the non-
practicing lawyer is arguably still subject to the general rule on integrity
and maintains obligations to the administration of justice, in relationship
to employees, and to the law society and the profession."6) Thus, so long
as the lawyer-politician (other than the attorney general) is careful not to
inadvertently create a solicitor-client relationship, and explicitly reminds
Cabinet that he is not acting as their lawyer, he would not be subject to that
particular confidentiality or to privilege."7
Conclusion
Unlike other members of Cabinet, a resigning attorney general is subject to
a lawyer's professional obligation of confidentiality and to solicitor-client
privilege. He thus cannot publicly disclose his reasons for resignation
under current law. However, he is certainly immune to law society
discipline if the disclosure is made in the legislature and is potentially
immune insofar as the disclosure can be considered an exercise of his
public functions. Nonetheless, and partly for greater clarity and public
confidence, a narrow exception to confidentiality and privilege in these
circumstances should be asserted to protect the attorney general's role as
"guardian of the public interest" by allowing him to disclose that Cabinet
attempted to influence prosecutorial decisions or rejected his advice of
clear unconstitutionality or unlawfulness. Arguably, this exception should
also apply where the attorney general feels it necessary to disassociate
himself from conduct by the prime minister or Cabinet that threatens public
confidence in the administration ofjustice. However, this exception would
be questionable where Cabinet rejects advice of only probable or possible
unconstitutionality, where the legal advice does not go to constitutionality
or unlawfulness, or where the attorney general loses confidence in the
prime minister as leader.
In contrast, although the status of the non-lawyer attorney general is
unclear, he is under the lawyer's obligation of confidentiality in at most
a nominal sense-as he would not be subject to law society discipline-
although solicitor-client privilege might apply. Cabinet members other
115. See ibid, r 4.1-4.3. Note however that, if referring to herself as a lawyer, the politician who
happens to be a lawyer could nonetheless be engaged in "marketing" and so could conceivably violate
these rules, particularly the rule on referring to oneself as a "specialist" without holding a specialist
designation from a law society: r 4.3-1.
116. Ibid, rr 2.1, 5.1-5.7, 6.1-6.3, 7.1-7.8.
117. See ibid, r 3.3- ,1 commentary 4: "A lawyer also owes a duty of confidentiality to anyone seeking
advice or assistance on a matter invoking a lawyer's professional knowledge, although the lawyer
may not render an account or agree to represent that person. A solicitor and client relationship is often
established without formality."
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than the attorney general who happen to be lawyers can disclose their
reasons for resignation without violating the rules of professional conduct.
Four closing caveats are necessary. First, a principled resignation of an
attorney general is rare. Second, an attorney general disclosing his reasons
for resignation would, like any politician in any circumstances, be wise to
do so in the legislature so as to gain the absolute protection of parliamentary
privilege."8 Third, even if a resigning attorney general did not himself
disclose the reasons for his resignation, it would in all likelihood be leaked
by someone else, or at least speculated on in the media.19 Fourth, in reality
an attorney general would be unlikely to face discipline from his respective
law society, and such discipline might not even be possible. Nonetheless,
even where the rules of professional conduct are merely aspirational or
otherwise unenforceable,2° attorneys general are uniquely positioned to
encourage public respect for the legal profession and the administration of
justice by attempting to follow-or otherwise honour-the text and spirit
of those rules.
118. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 59 at 37: "[T]he main effect of increased attention from law
societies may be to extend a distinction recognized by all canny Canadian politicians: statements that
could have legal consequences-such as defamation-should be made inside, not outside, the doors
of the legislature."
119. A serious disagreement in Cabinet may give rise to a leak regardless of whether or not it results
in a resignation. See, e.g., Sossin, supra note 16 at 49 [footnote omitted]: "In rare instances, a leaked
memo or document leads to some news coverage and perhaps the attention of opposition parties."
120. See, e.g., FLSC Model Code, supra note 30 at Preface: "Some sections of the Code are of more
general application, and some sections, in addition to providing ethical guidance, may be read as
aspirational." Obviously, the professional obligation of confidentiality is so fundamental as to not be
aspirational. However, where the rules are unenforceable, confidentiality is surely as important as any
other unenforceable rule.

